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FOREWORD
The Internet and Public International Law
BY JOHN M. ROGERS*
t is perhaps commonplace to observe that recent developments in
information technology are revolutionizing most aspects of our
lives. Anything that affects our lives so profoundly will, of
necessity, have a significant effect on the law. We can expect that the
information revolution will have a comparably significant impact on the
international system ofbinding obligations often calledpublic international
law. Just what that will be is of course extremely difficult to predict.
Compounding that difficulty is the lack of consensus on just what actually
amounts to the public international legal system. Scholars and lawyers still
debate fundamental questions regarding the sources of public international
law, the ways in which public international law binds, and indeed whether
it in fact binds.
* Thomas P. Lewis Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1970,
Stanford University; J.D. 1974, University of Michigan.
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The theme of the annual meeting of the Section on International Law
of the Association of American Law Schools, held in the first week of the
new millennium, was the effect of the Internet on public international law.
The idea was not only to explore the effect of the new technology on the
law, and vice versa, but also to see if the changes can give us some
additional perspective on what public international law is and how it works.
The contents of this Symposium, articles and essays reflecting the panel
contributions of the Association of American Law Schools Section
meeting, supplementedby two thoughtful student notes, provide significant
and often surprising insights into how international law and Internet
technology have and will affect each other. The Symposium also permits
us to examine the nature of the international legal system from a fresh
standpoint.
In this introduction, I describe briefly the articles, essays, and notes in
this Symposium. I then attempt some preliminary observations about what
their insights suggest about the nature of public international law.
Professor Joseph W. Dellapenna starts by putting the Internet's impact
on international law in the far broader context of the effect of technology
on law generally. He uses the example of how maritime law principles
developed as a direct result of technological limitations on the ability of
ships to stay in contact with their home ports. In treating the general
relation of technology to law, Dellapenna steps back to define his terms,
and to probe the intellectual foundations necessary to treat the subject.
Rejecting the argument that all knowledge (and therefore all law) is
socially constructed, he posits that "material conditions of [a] time shape
intellectual fashions at least as much as intellectual fashions shape material
conditions."' The two develop, he says, in a type of unpredictable
interactive loop. "Changes in science and technology have transformative
power because the prevalent ideas in science and technology today are
central to the material conditions in which those ideas arise."2
Dellapenna then describes a number of ways in which science and
technology have changed public international law. Most obvious are the
technological subjects to which international regimes have been applied,
such as nuclear energy, outer space, oceanic resources, aviation, and now,
international electronic commerce. Dellapenna calls these the "ends" of
international law, and includes human rights among the ends affected by
technological change. He also anticipates changes in the "means" by which
'Joseph W. Dellapenna, Law in a Shrinking World: The Interaction ofScience
and Technology with International Law, 88 KY. L.J. 809, 828 (1999-2000).
2 1d. at 830.
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international law functions. Globalization driven by technology has
fostered, for instance, the flow of power from nation-states to region-based
organizations such as the European Union.
Finally, Dellapenna argues that the very structure of the international
legal process is changing as a result of the information revolution. He
explains that the structure of law is governed, at a deeply embedded level,
by the way in which law is recorded and recalled. There are fundamental
differences among oral law, scribal law, printed law, and "digital law." For
example, the invention of the printing press made text more inherently
unchangeable: even if one copy of a book is altered, all the other copies
remain the same. The very uniformity of printed text may convey a deep
message about the immutability or consistency of law. Putting law on the
Internet, in contrast, not only makes it available at lower cost to a wider
audience (an insight we might have expected), but also it does this in a way
that can be easily changed by either the author or the reader. The latter
characteristic may ultimately have a more profound effect on the law as
an intellectual construct. This is just one example of how "digital law"
may differ in structure from printed law. The ultimate way in which
the interactive loop of technology and law develops remains to be seen. In
the face of such uncertainty, Dellapenna concludes, those who hope to
make reasonably appropriate decisions must "attend[ ] to the intellectual
structures as well as to the material conditions"3 of decision-making
processes.4
Dean Henry H. Perritt, Jr. follows with a piece that is full of insights
about how the Internet is changing the public international legal system.
Perritt first argues that the Internet is a more portentous technological
development than, for instance, radio or television, because it is inherently
global and because it has very low economic barriers to entry.
Although the Symposium, to keep its scope manageable, was to focus
on public international law, Perritt tests the confines of the public
law/private law distinction. To the extent that he is impelled to do so by the
social results of technological developments, his piece exemplifies the
changes in thinking that Dellapenna anticipates. Conflict of laws issues, for
instance, are raised more often these days because of the globalization of
3 Id. at 879.
' Professor Dellapenna has provided a wealth of citations to related areas of
inquiry in international law and jurisprudence. Here Dellapenna perhaps reflects,
by example, the very influence of digital law that he discusses. Every reader is
invited down a different path of further inquiry, much as is the case when one
"surfs" the Internet.
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trade, and such issues require solutions from the public international law
system. "Public law defines the contours of private law."5
Perritt argues that the Internet improves the effectiveness of the
international legal system in three ways. First, it facilitates the development
of new law by making the negotiation of treaties easier and by increasing
the effectiveness of nongovernmental actors and institutions that push for
such regimes. Second, the Internet promotes governmental acceptance of
public international law, again by empowering nongovernmental actors,
and also by making international and comparative law more accessible to
judges and legislators aroundthe world. Third, the Internet aids in detecting
violations of international law and in imposing sanctions, by empowering
those who are harmed by the violations, such as ethnic minorities. Perritt
advocates steps to improve and protect these effects, such as increasing
access and improving bibliographic resources. In this regard he supports
preserving the open infrastructure of the Internet, in an effort to provide
resistance to exercises of monopoly power.
Perritt also argues that the Internet is naturally more amenable to
private ordering schemes than to public regulation. Traditionally accepted
territorial rules of court jurisdiction at least arguably do not work so well
with regard to Internet commerce.6 Less territorial regimes, such as those
applied to the sea and outer space, according to Perritt, are informative but
not entirely suitable models for Internet regulation. More conceivable, he
contends, are relatively thin intergovernmental frameworks for private
ordering. Among the many examples he suggests are the internationally-
controlled private corporation to regulate Internet domain names, and the
credit card charge-back system in the United States.
Professor Wedgwood follows with an Internet-inspired thought
experiment that challenges our very notion of what statehood means in
international law. Can there be a state subject to international law that
exists solely on the Internet? This is not so fanciful as it might first seem,
given the serious recent concern that computer intelligence may be able to
replicate itself and take power from humans sometime in the twenty-first
century. Professor Wedgwood notes the recent spate of admissions to the
5Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing the Public InternationalLegal
System, 88 KY. L.J. 885, 892 (1999-2000).
6 Professor Jack Goldsmith has taken issue with the more extreme versions of
the argument. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. R.Ev.
1199 (1998). Goldsmith argues that the differences between Cyberspace
transactions and other transnational transactions have been overstated, and that
traditional legal tools and technology have the potential to resolve the
multijurisdictional regulatory problems implicated by Cyberspace.
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United Nations of micro-states like Monaco and Nauru. She asks, why
must a state be territorial? The Internet may permit the type of cultural and
political commonality that formerly required, as a practical matter,
territorial integrity. The very conceivability of states with Cyberspace
"territory" forces us to think more clearly about the fundamental meaning
of statehood as it now exists.7
Two thoughtful student notes conclude this Symposium issue of the
KentuckyLawJournal. Each deals with problems of copyright enforcement
in Cyberspace. One is concerned with the rights of creators of intellectual
property. The other comes from the different perspective of preserving the
vigorous freedom of the Internet system.
Heather McGregor explains that geographical locale is important to
several aspects of traditional protection of intellectual property. For
instance, the location of first publication is relevant to choice of law, and
the location of property is relevant to personal jurisdiction. Where
intellectual property on the Internet has no easily ascertainable physical
place, location-related legal principles provide less protection for intellec-
tual property. Possible solutions include Internet self-regulation schemes.
Also, until new international agreements can be achieved, McGregor
proposes for the short term a scheme of standard presumptions about other
countries' copyright laws.'
From the other perspective, Justin Williamson examines the huge
potential liability of Internet service providers in the United States for
relatively innocent copyright infringement. He explains how the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 protects such providers, but only when
a complex body of requirements are met. When the Act's protections do
not apply, Internet service providers are subject to copyright infringement
suits under general copyright law. Recent federal cases under that law have
not been consistently sensitive to the practical difficulties of Internet
service providers who merely provide the means by which customers
violate copyrights.
Is there an overall insight we can derive about the nature of the
international legal system? A general tension in legal philosophy between
natural and positive theories of law manifests itself in differing concepts
aboutwhat international law is andhow itworks. On one side, international
7Ruth Wedgwood, Essay, Cyber-Nations, 88 KY. L.J. 957 (1999-2000).
8 Heather McGregor, Law on a Boundless Frontier: The Internet and Inter-
national Law, 88 KY. L.. 967 (1999-2000).
9 Justin Williamson, Online Service Provider CopyrightLiability: Is the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act the Answer?, 88 KY. L.J. 987 (1999-2000).
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law is thought of as an ideal, an aspect of the Ultimate Good that law and
lawyers and legal systems eternally strive for. On the other side, interna-
tional law may be thought of as a system of binding obligations among
states. On this more positivistview, international law is a system dependent
for its existence and content on the nature and desires of the states
themselves, and thus no more eternal or unchanging than those states.
Under this conception, international law would cease to exist if states were
to cease to exist. Systems of binding obligations among other entities might
of course remain, but they would be different systems. None of this denies
the existence of Ultimate Good, which positivists may well assume. The
descriptive point10 is only that systems of binding obligations live and die,
form and deform, inspire and expire, without being tied to that Good. It can
be objectively misleading to assume the contrary.
At one or another level of abstraction, the essays in this Symposium
reflect that law in general, and international law in particular, is determined
by the nature of its subjects. How people communicate may change
fundamentally the importance of territory to the nature of the nation-state.
Professor Wedgwood expresses this most colorfully, but the idea courses
through many of the papers. The remarkable speed of technological change
may cause changes in the nature of statehood to be perceivable, for the first
time, over a relatively short period. If international law can be seen to
morph as the nature ofstatehood morphs, the view of international law as
a system of binding obligations, and not as an aspect of the Ultimate Good,
should become all the harder to deny.
10 1 was (constructively) criticized recently for not providing a normative
justification for viewing public international law as a system that may conflict with
other systems of binding obligation (i.e., domestic law). See Curtis A. Bradley,
Book Review, International Law and United States Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 757,
759-60 (1999). But to the extent that my characterization of international law is
descriptive, no normative justification is required. By analogy, no normative
justification is required for the view that the earth revolves around the sun rather
than vice versa. We can accept the view, inter alia, simply because it explains
things better.
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